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The Evolution of Autonomy 
Abstract  
There can be little doubt that, at least in the Western world, autonomy is the ruling principle in 
contemporary bioethics. In spite of its triumph however, the dominance of the concept of autonomy 
is being increasingly questioned.  In this paper, I explore the nature of autonomy, how it came to 
displace the Hippocratic tradition in medicine and how different concepts of autonomy have 
evolved.  I argue that the reduction of autonomy to “the exercise of personal choice” in medicine 
has led to a “tyranny of autonomy” which can be inimical to ethical medical practice rather than 
conducive to it.  
I use the case of Kerrie Woolterton as an  illustration of how misplaced regard to patient autonomy 
can lead to tragic consequences.  An analysis of autonomy based on the work of Rachel Haliburton is 
described and applied to the role of autonomy in a recent bioethical debate – that arising from 
Savulescu’s proposal that conscientious objection by health-care professionals should not be 
permitted in the NHS.  In conclusion, I suggest Kukla’s concept of conscientious autonomy as one 
promising pathway to circumvent both the limitations and adverse effects of the dominance of 
current (mis)understandings of autonomy in biomedical ethics. 
In the British Medical Journal in 2003 Professor Ruth Macklin 
(2003.p1419) famously suggested that “dignity is a useless concept” 
in medical ethics, being nothing other than a “vague restatement of 
other more precise, notions…….to invoke the concept of dignity 
without clarifying its meaning is to use a mere slogan” (Macklin. 
2003; 1419). Macklin goes on to suggest that ‘autonomy’ is one word 
that could be substituted for “dignity”. A decade later, I would 
suggest that far from being a more precise term than dignity, 
autonomy itself and certainly by itself is arguably a useless concept in 
medical ethics and will explain why I have recently come to this 
conclusion.  
 
The Cautionary Case of Kerrie Wooltorton 
On the 17th Sept 2007, Kerrie Wooltorton arrived in the A and E 
department of the Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital, having 
attempted to take her own life by drinking antifreeze. She had a 
previous history of self-harm and had been labelled with the bête 
noire of psychiatric diagnoses – a personality disorder.  She had 
poisoned herself on several previous occasions but this time was 
different. She produced a note stating that “I would like no lifesaving 
treatment to be given “only “medicines to help relieve my 
discomfort, painkillers, oxygen etc”. She was adamant on repeated 
questioning that “the letter says what I want”. The psychiatrist who 
saw her deemed that she did not lack mental capacity to make this 
decision, nor was she eligible to be sectioned under the Mental 
Health Act. The doctors took the view that the note constituted an 
advance directive and was therefore legally binding.  
Therefore, Kerrie’s expressed wishes were honoured and two days 
later she died from ethylene glycol poisoning. Both bioethicists and 
lawyers of course subsequently went into overdrive, mostly arguing 
over legal niceties concerning whether the medical staff did or did 
not in fact have power under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or the 
Mental Health Act 1983 to intervene. There was much less attention 
given to asking fundamental questions about the meaning of 
personal autonomy and its relation to others. In Kerrie’s case at least 
one other – her father- was “angry that the hospital did not treat her 
when she was dying. He blames the doctors for her death.” 
Consultant physician Alexander Heaton, when asked by the coroner 
what would have happened if he had intervened, replied: 'It's my 
duty to follow her wishes.”  So in accordance with the principle of 
respect for autonomy – the touchstone of contemporary medical 
ethics, he and his colleagues left her to die. She was aged 26.  
How could it be that doctors who once would have instinctively 
responded in accordance with the Hippocratic precept of “First do no 
harm”, let a young woman die in this way?  It seems it is not only 
babies but adults too whose lives are endangered by being thrown 
out with the Hippocratic bathwater.  
 
‘A Thoroughly Noxious Concept’: Defining Autonomy  
Perhaps it was cases like Kerrie’s, that prompted the feminist 
philosopher Sarah Hoagland, to dub autonomy “a thoroughly noxious 
concept” (1998: 144), the sociologist David Smail to call it an 
“illusion” (2005:44), and even the well-known Kantian scholar Onora 
O’Neill to personify it as “a naked Emperor of questionable 
legitimacy” (2003:1). For many, autonomy has become, rather like 
football, their religion.  Barrister Charles Foster in his recent book, 
refers to the ‘cult of autonomy’ (2009) and William Gaylin one of the 
cofounders of the Hastings Center condemns what he calls the 
“uncompromising and rigid worship of personal autonomy” as 
“naïve, out of touch … and ultimately, philosophically and morally 
untenable” (1996:45). 
So how then did we reach the point of sacrificing human life, or at 
least watch human life sacrifice itself, on the altar of autonomy? 
One of Ruth Macklin’s primary arguments with dignity is the problem 
of defining what we mean by it. This is a genuine difficulty but is no 
less the case with autonomy.  
Gerald Dworkin considers autonomy a ‘slippery concept’ containing 
many nuances including “Liberty (positive or negative) dignity, 
integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility and self-
knowledge, self–assertion, critical reflection, freedom from 
obligation, absence of external causation and knowledge of one’s 
own interests” (Dworkin G 1988:6). 
Agich more briefly states, “The ideals implicit in (autonomy) include 
independence and self-determination, the ability to make rational 
and free decisions and the ability to identify accurately one’s desires 
and to assess what constitutes one’s own best interests”(1990:12). 
Beauchamp and Childress define autonomy positively:- “an extension 
of political self-governance by the individual; personal self-rule of the 
self while remaining free from both controlling interferences by 
others and personal limitations, such as inadequate understanding, 
that prevent meaningful choice” (1989:68)  and negatively:- 
“Autonomous actions should not be subjected to controlling 
constraints by others” (1994:125) and they take great pains to 
distinguish the principle of autonomy from the principle of respect 
for autonomy.  
When it comes what is needed to exercise autonomy, many would 
settle for such key common features as appropriate mental 
capacities and independence (both of which pose obvious multiple 
problems in the context of medicine). However Joseph Raz in “The 
Morality of Freedom” (1988) insists as well on the presence of an 
‘adequate range of options’ which are ‘morally acceptable’ from 
which to choose. It is important to note that Raz’s view differs from 
the general understanding of autonomy that predominates in 
healthcare. The latter focuses on an individual realising their capacity 
to make choices, and merely requires that these choices be informed 
and free from coercion. The existence of morally acceptable options 
from which to choose is assumed but not usually addressed or 
subjected to conscious analysis and reflection. With all the focus 
being on independent choice, often it is the validity (or lack of) 
informed consent, rather than a range of morally acceptable options 
to give consent for, that becomes the sole criterion for whether 
autonomy is being exercised or not. 
In addition to this emphasis within Razian autonomy, others 
distinguish between actual autonomy and ideal, decisional autonomy 
and executional, emotional and behavioural, individual and relational 
and so on. With all these distinctions, small wonder that Dworkin 
laments, “The only features that hold constant from one author to 
another are that autonomy is a feature of persons and that it is a 
desirable quality to have’ (Dworkin G 1988:6). O’Neill wryly 
comments that “this is hardly an exacting claim, yet I doubt whether 
it is correct on either point. There are lots of writers –they include 
many feminists, virtue ethicists and communitarians – who doubt 
that autonomy is always of value. There are others including various 
determinists and behaviourists who think that it is an illusion” (O’ 
Neill 2002:22).  She cites Hill’s view that “Kant never predicates 
autonomy of persons, but only of principles and willings: Mill 
predicates autonomy of states but not of persons” (Hill in O’Neill 
2002:22). 
Autonomy – A Divided Concept 
I would argue that if the difficulty in defining dignity means it must 
be a useless concept this must be to be even more the case for 
autonomy since it could be considered philosophically schizoid, 
having at least 2 mutually contradictory historical strands to which 
O’Neill and many others draw attention. I want to briefly outline the 
distinctive features of these two types.  
Firstly Kantian autonomy, which is so overshadowed by the later 
Millian form that bioethics students seem to have real difficulty in 
grasping its essential nature.  For Kant, human freedom rests in the 
ability to be governed by reason and to be motivated by reason 
alone. Kant referred to this as the autonomy of the will, contrasting it 
with the heteronomous will directed by external causes, other than 
reason. The autonomous agent in Kantian terms then, is one able to 
overcome the promptings of external agents such as desire or 
emotion, if they are in conflict with reason. As Scruton (2001 PAGE) 
succinctly puts it “Because autonomy is only manifest in obedience 
to reason, and because reason must guide action always through 
imperatives, autonomy is described in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals as ‘that property of the will which is a law 
unto itself’. It is also the ground of the dignity of human nature and 
every rational creature’.    
O’Neill rightly considers however that contemporary admiration for 
personal autonomy owes far more to John Stuart Mill than to Kant: 
although many of those admirers crave and claim Kantian 
credentials. Interestingly she claims that Mill hardly ever uses the 
word autonomy himself and when he does use it, it is in passing 
reference to cities or states and never to individuals. The reason for 
this, she suggests is that Mill saw the word as too closely allied to 
Kant’s non-naturalistic views of freedom and reason which Mill 
emphatically rejects (p30).  It is subsequent commentators on Mill, 
rather than Mill himself who have expressed his concepts in terms of 
autonomy.  
Mill’s version of autonomy within a naturalistic frame sees 
individuals as not merely choosing to implement whatever desires 
they happen to have, but taking charge of those desires as the 
expression of her or his own nature. As Mill writes in On Liberty, “The 
free development of such individuality is one of the leading 
essentials of well-being” (1859 Page). On this basis, Mill asserts his 
famous dicta that “there is a limit to the legitimate interference of 
collective opinion with individual independence” and that “the sole 
end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection.”  
Rachel Haliburton in her lucid and thought-provoking new work 
Autonomy and The Situated Self, likens comparing these two 
concepts of autonomy as like comparing apples and oranges. She 
claims the common view that utilitarianism focuses on consequences 
and Kantianism on intentions, rather than being the main cause of 
the difference between them is the result of more fundamental 
differences. (2013: 61) 
 
Contours of Kantian Autonomy  
Haliburton elucidates these differences through exploring the 
peculiarities of both concepts in turn. Concerning the Kantian self 
she suggest “many of its features could just as easily have been 
created by a writer of science fiction as by a philosopher” (2013:63).  
Kantian autonomy lies in the rational capacity to determine what the 
moral law is and to follow it for its own sake. As long as my actions 
arise from a Good Will, their consequences are utterly irrelevant.  
“The moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is 
expected from it ….For all these effects could be brought about 
through other causes and would not require the will of a rational 
being, while the highest and unconditional good can be found only in 
such a will” (Metaphysics of Morals 20). This requires of course that 
even generally positive feelings such as sympathy, loyalty and care 
must be set aside in preference to Kantian duty.  
Several consequences arise from this:-  
 
1) Only rational beings have value 
Within the world of medicine, this means that we can 
experiment on animals in any way we like but it also means 
that the new-born and the patient with advanced dementia can 
also be treated in exactly the same way. Conversely, 
contemporary philosophers have wondered if Kant would 
respect the autonomy of an android or other thinking 
computer?  
 
2) Our instinctive ways of moral thinking are invalidated  
Consider a woman who lives all her life alone on a small 
pension who has not contributed to society at all but has 
always done her duty and compare her with a highly successful 
doctor who decides she will take early retirement to go an work 
in Sierra Leone because it makes her feel much better about 
herself and she saves thousands of lives. For Kant the first is a 
moral success and the second a moral failure because the Good 
Will even if it achieves nothing “it would sparkle like a jewel in 
its own right as something that has its full worth in 
itself…Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither diminish nor 
augment this moral worth. “ (Metaphysics of Morals 13) 
 
3) Consequences are not simply less important than intentions, 
they are meaningless.    
If in the case of Kerrie Woolterton considered earlier Dr Heaton 
had indeed as he stated “done his duty” in Kantian terms, then 
Kerrie’s death is morally irrelevant  
 
4) Moral rules are discovered not made  
All Kantian selves, if they reason correctly will arrive at the 
same moral conclusions and these will be absolute truths. Just 
as there can be no square circles, there can be no occasion on 
which it is right to lie.  
 
A Utilitarian Understanding of Autonomy  
Turning next to the utilitarian self, we discover a kind of distorted 
mirror image of the Kantian self. For the utilitarian, the moral goal is 
to increase the overall amount of happiness and decrease the overall 
amount of pain both in her own life but also in all sentient beings.  
 
For the utilitarian self therefore, 
 
1) Intentions are not simply less important than consequences, 
they are morally meaningless.  
“He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is 
morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being 
paid for his trouble;” (Mill 2001:18) 
 
2) The morality of actions must be adjusted according to particular 
circumstances 
Because there are no absolutes, depending on the 
circumstances a lie might be wrong but to save a life or even 
simply to prevent hurt feelings, a lie might be right.  
 
3) Moral action is dependent on particular feelings or intuitions. 
The moral grounding of maximising happiness and minimising 
pain comes through observation and experience. As Mill states, 
the merits of utility “can only be determined by practiced self-
consciousness and self-observation assisted by observation of 
others.” However whilst this may be possible in terms of our 
own lives, the moral obligation to increase global happiness 
comes at a much higher price to the self and few are prepared 
to pay it. 
 
4)  Moral truths are developed educationally rather than 
discovered  
It is as we understand the world more clearly and shape society 
through political and social action and see which policies work 
best that we determine what maximises overall happiness and 
minimises overall pain. Indeed such was Mill’s faith in the 
power of education he believed it would not only increase 
benevolence to all human beings but “to the whole sentient 
creation”.  
 
5) Sentient beings have value 
As Jeremy Bentham famously expressed it -  the question that 
identifies objects toward whom moral obligations exist “is not 
can they reason? Nor can they talk but can they suffer?”   
 
Autonomy in the Real World 
Although at first glance it may seem easier to understand and 
identify the utilitarian self rather than the Kantian self with the “real 
world” we inhabit, I think Haliburton is right to point out the 
utilitarian world view is also very odd.  
It is a world where we are morally bound to care about the pleasures 
and pains of the whole world as well as our own. Furthermore if 
Kantian criteria are too exclusive for moral citizenship- ruling out 
babies for example, then the problem with the utilitarian alternative 
is that it allows in a vast crowd that may be difficult to define. This 
leads to difficult questions. If we allow dolphins in, do we exclude 
porpoises? “If moral personhood provides the dividing line between 
what we can eat and what we can’t must the utilitarian self always 
be a vegetarian?” (Haliburton ?  
Finally in a world of QALYs and trolley bus thought-experiments, we 
have grown so used to the idea of being able to quantify pain and 
pleasure that we have become immune to how odd this idea is. As JJ 
Smart’s (19730 famous sheriff’s dilemma illustrates, it leads to a 
situation where no action, not even murder, is inherently forbidden 
as long as the books balance (or else can be cooked) in favour of 
increased overall happiness.  
We have become so familiar in thinking about autonomy in Kantian 
and utilitarian terms that the two become fused like conjoined twins. 
We can’t apply one without thinking about the other at least as a foil 
or a rival. They have become part of the very fabric of how bioethical 
dilemmas are explicated but because both intentions and 
consequences are important there is continual tension in the 
bioethical frame that is more likely to rip the moral fibres than 
resolve the problem.  
Within the pull of the tensions of this dichotomy, we have forgotten 
how strange it would appear to the pre-enlightenment philosophers. 
Neither paradigm has for example any place for virtue or God or care 
or community. The focus of both of them is on individuality and 
equality and locks them ultimately into an unresolvable conflict.  
I again agree with Haliburton in her central thesis that because 
bioethicists are torn between the worlds of the utilitarian and 
Kantian selves, they have gravitated towards the concept of 
autonomy as a way to avoid the moral impasse. In the process 
Kantian autonomy has been given a liberal gloss “in which the ideal 
of what it is to flourish as an autonomous being is tied to our 
capacity to determine for ourselves what gives meaning and value to 
own lives.” (Haliburton 2013:71) This alone is all that is required. No 
one else need share our chosen values and there is nothing outside 
of ourselves (save possibly the harm principle) which we need to 
take into account. 
Fundamentalist Autonomy 
We see a very clear example of this kind of autonomous 
fundamentalism in a 2006 paper by Julian Savulescu. The article 
entitled Conscientious objection in medicine caused outrage at the 
time with interestingly not a single supportive letter in the flurry of 
dozens of responses that ensued. One physician opined “After 30 
years of reading the BMJ, Savulescu’s article was the first to make 
me feel physically sick” So what exactly had Savulescu said that 
produced such widespread emesis among BMJ readers?  
A few direct quotes will give you the flavour: 
“When the duty is a true duty, conscientious objection is wrong and 
immoral. When there is a grave duty, it should be illegal.” 
“A doctors' conscience has little place in the delivery of modern 
medical care.” 
“This (paternalism) has been squarely overturned by greater patient 
participation in decision making and the importance given to 
respecting patients' autonomy.” 
“If we do not allow moral values or self-interest to corrupt the 
delivery of the just and legal delivery of health services, we should 
not let other values, such as religious values, corrupt them either.” 
“Values and conscience should not influence the care an individual 
doctor offers to his or her patient. The door to “value-driven 
medicine” is a door to a Pandora's box of idiosyncratic, bigoted, 
discriminatory medicine.”  
I have previously commented on this article elsewhere (Stammers 
2006) but would here draw attention to the fact here that not only 
would Savulescu’s demands lead to universal over-ruling of the 
doctor’s conscience on any matter but that very conscience is a part 
of what constitutes the autonomy of both doctors and patients. 
When Savulescu refers to the importance of respecting the patient’s 
autonomy, he is referring only to the individual autonomy of the 
utilitarian self.  There is no trace of allowance for Kantian or even 
Razian autonomy, though there is more than a touch of the 
aforementioned craving of Kantian credentials present in the article.  
Just as Savulescu rejects the paternalistic Hippocratic values of the 
past as being made obsolete by utilitarian autonomy, the tragedies 
of the Woolterton case and others like it are leading to more 
comprehensive and clinically appropriate considerations of 
autonomy, many of which such as relational autonomy originate 
from feminist writers such as … 
I conclude however with a mention of Rebecca Kukla’s recent article 
on conscientious autonomy – a thick concept of autonomy which 
deserves to be better known. Kukla maintains that in many medical 
situations in which patients find themselves, self-determination is 
neither a helpful nor appropriate goal. She suggests that 
conscienciousness is an alternative normative notion which is more 
apposite. This relates to commitment to uphold values and ideals 
formed by and forming our consciences.  Like Kantian autonomy, 
conscientious autonomy is manifested in actions that express fidelity 
to goals and ideals to which the agent is responsibly committed but 
unlike Kantian autonomy, they are not derived from pure reason. 
Monitoring one’s blood pressure or blood sugar are hardly 
categorical imperatives but are the sorts of expression of 
conscientious autonomy, Kukla has in mind.  
Secondly the autonomous will is in Kukla’s view a dangerously 
inappropriate place for the sources of principles that bind her to 
health care. Conscientious autonomy can involve commitment to 
norms from various sources including (pace Professor Savulescu) 
those prescribed by those whose authority we accept.  
Kukla goes on to make further distinctions but the point I want to 
emphasize here is that she is one of many at the frontline of clinical 
care showing that the personal, individualistic concept of autonomy 
like the paradigm of paternalism that preceded it, is beginning to 
show its age. The ‘triumph of autonomy’ trumpeted by James 
Childress is beginning to sound like premature triumphalism and the 
tyranny of such autonomy is beginning to be broken. Is autonomy 
now evolving from a self-centred individualism to a more inclusive 
communitarian approach? Kerrie Woolterton’s fate would suggest it 
needs to.  
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